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RECENT DECISIONS
involving a question7 of title, which is properly within the jurisdiction
of the state courts.
R.L.
REAL PROPERTY-LANDLORD AND TENANT-MEASURE OF DABI-

BREACH OF COVENANT.-Defendant leased premises encumbered by a mortgage to the plaintiff and expressly covenanted that
the plaintiff lessee might "peaceably and quietly have, hold and enjoy
the said demised premises for the term aforesaid." Subsequently,
defendant conveyed the fee in the premises to another who defaulted
in payment of interest on the mortgage. Plaintiff was evicted under
foreclosure proceedings and now sues for breach of the covenant,
claiming substantial damages. Defendant contends that no damages
may be recovered unless it be the return of rent paid in advance. A
verdict was directed in favor of defendant. On appeal, held, reversed; new trial ordered. Substantial damages measured by the
value of the lease less rent reserved may be recovered. Ganz v.
Clark, 252 N. Y. 92, 169 N. E. 100 (1929).
The law applicable to the case is apparent in a restatement of the
tenets of the leading case of Mack v. Patchin.' Ordinarily in an
action by a lessee against a lessor for breach of a covenant of quiet
enjoyment, due to a defective title, recovery is limited to the amount
of rent paid in advance and mesne profits for which the lessee is
liable. The reason for the rule is that "owing to the state of the
law as to real property, the undoubted owner of an estate often finds,
unexpectedly, difficulty in making out title, which he cannot overcome." 2 Frequently, the difficulty lies in defects of title of ancient
origin, and the present owner should not be unduly penalized for deficiencies in no way attributable to lack of good faith or diligence on
his part. Consequently, the rule is limited in its application to those
cases in which there is no fraud, inequitable conduct or failure to
act when it is in his power to act.3 In the instant case, there was a
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'Nichols v. Marsh, 61 Mich. 509, 28 N. W. 699, rehearing denied (1886),
29 N. W. 37, 62 Mich. 439 (1891), and writ of error dismissed, 140 U. S.344,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798 (1891); New Marshal Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine
Co., 223 U. S.473, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238 (1912), aff'g 199 Mass. 546, 85 N. E.
741 (1908); Phinney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94 (1871); Becher v. Contour
Laboratories, 279 U. S.388, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356 (1929), aff'g 29 Fed. (2nd)
31 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928). See also David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501 (1870),
which was an action for deceit in the sale of patent rights, wherein it was held
that the state court had jurisdiction although its determination involved collaterally the question of the construction and validity of the letters patent issued
by the government.
142 N. Y. 167 (1870).
Cf. Matter of Strasburger, 132 N. Y. 128, 30 N. E.
379 (1892); and distinguish Wagner v. Van Schaick Realty Company, 163
App. Div. 632, 148 N. Y. Supp. 638 (lst Dept. 1914).
-Engle v. Fitch, 3 Law Rep. Q. B. 314, per Chief Judge Cockburn.
'In an action against the vendor of real property for breach of warranty
the vendee can recover substantial damages "if the vendor is guilty of fraud;
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failure to act, evidently born of a refusal -to incur expense which
would enable the covenantor to fulfil his contract. To permit mitigation of damages in such an instance would be to sanction the
breach of a contractual duty, due entirely to lack of good faith or
diligence. Such is not the intendment of the rule enunciated in Mack
v. Patchin nor of any concept of the law.
E. P. W.

TRUSTS-VALIDITY OF CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY.-De-

cedent had been engaged in the real estate business, taking title
to property in the names of dummy corporations, of which he was
president and sole stockholder, or in the names of his clerks. He
executed two instruments certifying that certain property which he
had conveyed and property to be thereafter conveyed to one of these
corporations belonged to his son; he also stated to others that he had
given the property to his son. The conveyance of the property was
made after the declaration of trust; the corporation received the deed
upon this trust and for the purpose of carrying it out, and all the
partners regarded the property as belonging to the son. There was
no consideration for the conveyance, but an implied promise and
understanding to execute a deed to the son for whose benefit the
property was so transferred. After the father's death, the papers
were found in the possession of the son and subsequently the corporation, by his direction, transferred the property and paid him the proceeds. By his will, the decedent attempted to divide his property
equally between his son and daughter. On the accounting of the son
as executor, he claimed the moneys which he bad received as the
purchase price for these properties, to which objections were filed by
the daughter's children, through their guardian, and the co-executor
of the estate. The Appellate Division, affirming the Surrogate, held
that the money must be accounted for; that it belonged to the corporation. On appeal, held, reversed; the title which passed to the
corporation was held for the son to whom the property belonged,
and he was entitled to the proceeds thereof; the corporation was
chargeable with the knowledge of its president that the conveyance
was subject to a trust for the benefit of the son, and the entries in
the corporate books that the properties belonged to the son were
evidence of the fact that the corporation recognized the trust. Matter
of Brown, 252 N. Y. 366, 169 N. E. 612 (1930).
or can convey but will not, either from perverseness or to secure a better
bargain; or if he has covenanted to convey, when he knew he had no power to

remedy a defect in his title; or where it is in his power to remedy a defect
in his title and he refuses or neglects to do so; or when he refuses to incur
expenses which would enable him to fulfil his contract." Supra Note 1, Mack
v. Patchin, at p. 172, per Chief Judge Earle.

